

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Presentation

This report summarises the conclusions and the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation mission of the regional project UNDP/GEF RAF/92/G32: *"Pollution control and other measures to protect biodiversity in Lake Tanganyika"*. The project associates the four riparian countries of the Lake: The Republic of Burundi, The Democratic Republic of Congo, The United Republic of Tanzania and The Republic of Zambia.

The project is part of the second tranche of the GEF pilot phase, with a financing of USD 10 million and a duration of five years. The project is executed by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). The implementation is entrusted to a Consortium of British Companies, led by the *Natural Resources Institute* (NRI) in cooperation with the *Marine Resources Assessment Group* (MRAG) and the *Institute of Freshwater Ecology* (IFE), hereafter referred to en masse as *"The NRI Consortium"*.

The mid-term evaluation is made 3 years and 3 months after the official starting date of the project (July 31, 1995, when the contract between UNOPS and the NRI Consortium was signed). Considering the delays occurred in most of the project activities, the evaluation mission does not consider the lateness of evaluation to be prejudicial to the pertinence, nor to the usefulness of its analyses. However, the remaining period until the official closing date of the project (July 31, 2000) is reduced equivalently. In addition to this, it should be noted that the possibility of completing the project within the given time is one of the crucial points of the evaluation.

The evaluation mission has analysed the history of the project, its present state of implementation and the pertinence of the approaches presently made to achieve the pursued objectives within the given period and budget of the project. But first of all, the evaluation mission has focused on the prospects of having, by the end of the project, the appropriate instruments and the required national capacities for enabling the riparian countries to manage the exceptional resources of the Lake Tanganyika in a sustainable way within the frame of its basin.

From this perspective the evaluation mission has endeavoured to adopt a prospective instead of a retrospective approach. The knowledge of the past and the genesis of the encountered problems are important only because of the deduced recommendations for the future.

Many recommendations are submitted to the examination of the GEF Unit within the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa. Several of the recommendations have a priority character – these are presented into boxes in this executive summary.

All the observations and recommendations are repeated in the report in a synoptic table indicating for each recommendation: who the observation is meant for (who is supposed to implement the recommendation) and, if necessary, observations for the implementation. The same table has a column referring to the chapters of the report where the arguments supporting the observations and recommendations have been developed.

Finally, according to its terms of reference, the evaluation mission has tried to deduce some general observations and recommendations that might be useful for other ongoing or future GEF projects. These observations and recommendations belong under § 5.: "*Lessons learned from the project*".

### **General observations**

In spite of the difficulties assessed in the project's course, the evaluation mission has noticed that, thanks to this project, the Authorities of the riparian countries have become fully aware of the exceptional character of the Lake Tanganyika and of the importance of focussing on its conservation. All the authorities and stakeholders that have been consulted have resumed on their own account the objective of protecting the Lake. That is why the evaluation mission finds that in spite of the present problems<sup>2</sup>, the project must be completed in order to come up to the legitimate expectations of the beneficiary countries.

The observed difficulties are not only a question of time and cannot be solved simply by a prolongation of the project in order to compensate for the ascertained delays. The evaluation mission estimates that the present situation of the project is giving rise for concern, not only when it comes to respecting the deadline but also concerning the productivity of the working methods and the quality of the expected results. This is due to several reasons: some are internal and will be analysed in details in this report while others are out of the influence of the project operators, in particular the insecure situation of the region.

In its present form (strategies, organisation and methods) the project is not able to completely fulfil the stipulated objectives. The strategies, the organisation and the present methods of the project need to be revised to lead to the expected results, namely *tools for the joint management of Lake Tanganyika meeting the present and future problems and exploitable by the riparian countries*.

The evaluation mission points out that the title of the project "*Pollution control and other measures to protect biodiversity in Lake Tanganyika*" must not override that the project is part of the GEF concentration area "*International Waters*". Being a project of the GEF pilot phase, it has an innovative and demonstrative purpose which is not limited to the conservation of the biodiversity of the Lake but aims more generally at a joint management of the Lake and its basin by the riparian countries, according to methods that are transposable to other water bodies and other countries facing the same type of problems.

Since the origin of the project, the project operators have focused on the scientific aspects of the supposed threats against biodiversity. The aspects relating to the management of international waters, in particular the institutional and legislative elements, have been somewhat neglected. And yet it is the way of management by the riparian countries – correctly described in legislative and institutional terms and supported by a satisfactory knowledge of the dynamic of the natural system of the Lake – that needs to be in focus of the questions raised by the joint exploitation of the international waters of the Lake Tanganyika.

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<sup>2</sup> Provided that the security situation in the region is not further deteriorated compared with the conditions under which the mission has taken place (November 1998).

**Priority recommendation No. 1: Refocus the project on the GEF concentration area "International Waters"**

*The evaluation mission finds it necessary to refocus the project on the GEF concentration area "International Waters" and more precisely to aim at the joint management of a shared water resource. All the activities and the results of the project should strive for this objective. The results should be presented in coherence with the use that will be made of them by the policy decision makers and the operators of the future managerial entity of the Lake.*

Having identified the core of the project, the evaluation mission has pointed out five essential points for the understanding of the present difficulties of the project in order to facilitate the structuring of the recommendations that are relevant for the subsequent implementation:

- 1) Evolution of the logical framework of the project and parallel development of principles concerning the management of water resources and their quality;
- 2) Project ownership by the beneficiary countries and capacity building;
- 3) Present state of substantive results and scheduling of future activities;
- 4) Substantiality and scientific coherence of the special studies;
- 5) External factors bearing on the implementation of the project.

A sixth point concerns the general lessons to be learned from the project.

**1. Evolution of the logical framework of the project and parallel development of principles concerning water resources and quality management**

The structure of the project has changed much since the origin. The evaluation mission has identified not less than six different successive versions of the project structure:

The activities described in the project brief from 1992;

The objectives and activities described in the project brief from 1993;

The objectives, products and activities as described in the Prodoc (1994);

The objectives, products and activities of the NRI Consortium's bid (1995);

The objectives, products and activities as revised in the inception report (1997);

The objectives, products and activities as implemented currently (November 1998).

A synoptic comparison of these different versions of the project design can be found in the body report (§ 3.1.4). It should be emphasised that, at the end of November 1998, during the TDA workshop in Lusaka (where the evaluation mission has attended as observer), the participating countries asked for a modification of the project strategies and scheduling which might result in a revision of the products and the activities. It seems indispensable that such a revision is based on the conclusions of the evaluation mission.

The evolution of the project organisation and of the scheduling of activities reflect the weakness of the threads that have guided the design and the implementation of the project right from the origin. As mentioned before, the project is part of the GEF concentration area "International waters" but it is the problem of biodiversity that has been put into focus, overriding the other

problems. This original lack of clarity concerning the target explains the hesitations in the project strategies and partly also the ascertained delays.

**Priority recommendation No. 2: Reformulate and stabilise the logical framework**

*The evaluation mission proposes that the logical framework of the project is reviewed with focus on the central problem that there is presently no framework for the management of the Lake Tanganyika as an international basin. Such a refocusing also allows the project to be put back in the GEF concentration area according to which the financing has been granted (see recommendation No. 1). In this perspective, the protection of the biodiversity appears to be a beneficial effect of a sound and rational management of the Lake and not the central problem of the management of the Lake.*

The evolution that has been observed in the project design has not taken into account the parallel development of the concepts and principles of water resources management as stated in the Copenhagen-Dublin-Rio process and refined since then. At the international level, the concepts and doctrines have developed and been refined since Rio (see § 3.1.3 and annex 7). The principles and methods for fresh water resources management that are shared between two or more countries have been developed, particularly in the SADC region to which three out of the four riparian countries of the Lake Tanganyika belong (D.R.Congo, Tanzania, Zambia).

**Priority recommendation No. 3: Ensure the consistency of the project with the principles for integrated management of water resources and with the pertinent conventions in this field, at a world wide as well as at regional level.**

*The evaluation mission considers that the project strategies and the expected main results (a regional convention and a strategic action plan) should be based on:*

- *the principles for management of water resources as stated in Dublin and Rio (Annex 7);*
- *the SADC protocol on shared water course systems;*
- *the International Convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses (1997);*

As for the project organisation, the evaluation mission has noticed two different versions of the organisation chart for the implementation (see § 3.1.6):

- the Prodoc version<sup>3</sup>;
- the version which is presented in the "Project Newsletter".

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<sup>3</sup> Contractually, the Prodoc is no longer the reference document since the signature of the contract binding UNOPS to the NRI Consortium. Actually, the Prodoc comes in the last place after the proposal of the NRI Consortium, in the precedence order of the documents that are an integral part of the contract. In this connection, the evaluation mission draws the attention to the fact that the technical proposal of the NRI Consortium has not been forwarded to the governments of the beneficiary countries. For these authorities, the Prodoc, being the only document they have signed remains the reference document (excepted amendments resulting from the collective decisions of the Steering Committee).

The evaluation mission is of the opinion that none of these two versions reflects correctly and completely the desired organisation for a project of this scale and that the present titles of the organs and positions give rise to further confusion.

**Priority recommendation No. 4: Revise the organisation chart of the project, write down the mandates and/or the terms of reference for each organ as well as job descriptions.**

*The evaluation mission proposes a revision of the organisation chart of the project based on the following (which is to be left unchanged until the completion of the project, without creating new structures, nor new positions):*

1. *Respect for the hierarchical position and the exact functions of the different positions and organs;*
2. *Compliance of the titles of organs and positions with their real mandates;*
  - *For example, the present "National Coordinators" are in fact the "National directors" of the project. The real national coordinators are the present "Assistants to the National Coordinators" who do not depend on their authority since they are part of the project team and are paid by the NRI Consortium.*
  - *Likewise, there can be only one managing authority of the project, namely the Project Steering Committee, consisting of the project parties (the four beneficiary countries, UNDP/GEF and UNOPS as executing agency). The present "National Steering Committees" have no authority to run the project. They are merely "National follow-up committees" whose main role is to facilitate the execution of the project in their respective countries, to ensure the compliance of the project orientation with the national policies and institutional framework and, finally, to look after the implementation of the results.*
3. *Respect for the national institutional framework: it should be avoided that the project team entrusts the implementation of certain activities to other national structures than those having the official authority (see priority recommendation No. 7).*

*A revised organisation chart for the project is given in the body report.*

## **2. Project ownership by the beneficiary countries and capacity building;**

The present institutional arrangements for implementation are not likely to facilitate the appropriation of the methods and results of the project by the political decision-makers and the national experts.

Actually, each team of national specialists inside each country has only a limited and fragmented view of the project strategies. The raw results are sent to the NRI Consortium in Great Britain. The results are treated by consultants outside the region with a very limited participation of national specialists.

Under these circumstances, the evaluation mission estimates that it will be difficult for the national decision-makers and scientists to take over the managing instruments and tools whose broad outlines they are still not acquainted with.

**Priority recommendation No. 5: Involve the nationals further in the definition of the work programmes**

*The evaluation mission emphasises that the NRI Consortium has only got a temporary role as a contractor of UNOPS, while the countries have a long term responsibility for the application of the project results. They are therefore in the best position to specify their own needs and should be associated as soon as possible in the use of the results. The working programmes of the project should be specified in close collaboration with the decision-makers and the national specialists according to the following elements:*

- 1. the expected situation by the end of the project (the needs of the countries for a joint management of the Lake during the post-project phase);*
- 2. the national policies and institutional frameworks (see priority recommendation No. 7);*
- 3. the capacities of the local experts; this will make it easier to target the needs for professional training (see priority recommendation No. 8).*

The evaluation mission finds that the recent recruitment of expatriate facilitators for coordination of the special studies does not come up to the objectives of the project unless it is supplemented by the positioning of regional counterparts<sup>4</sup>.

Instead of entrusting the coordination of certain activities to international experts, reducing the national experts to the role of executing fragmented tasks, the evaluation mission recommends that the progressive assumption of the coordination tasks by the national experts is initiated immediately.

**Priority recommendation No. 6: Make the best qualified national experts on the regional level, work in close relation with the recently recruited facilitators.**

*In order to do so, the Project Coordination Unit should make an effort:*

- 1) to identify the best qualified and recognised national experts on the regional level in the different fields of the project;*
- 2) to form two-person teams (expatriate facilitator + local specialist) in the four main fields of the special studies (pollution, sedimentation, fisheries, socio-economy);*
- 3) to make the local specialists intervene in other countries than their own in the same capacity as the expatriate facilitators and in close collaboration with these.*

The evaluation mission has noticed that the choice of national institutional operators is often guided by practical short-term considerations and consequently it does not always respect the official mandates of the national institutions. So, the choice of operators does not pay enough

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<sup>4</sup> The Project Steering Committee had recommended the recruitment of facilitators native from the beneficiary countries. However, the representatives of these countries have not been associated to the selection of facilitators appointed by the NRI Consortium and were simply confronted with the "fait accompli".

attention to the problem of a sustainable follow-up and development in the framework of the future management of the Lake.

**Priority recommendation No. 7: Identify which institutions are (or will be) mandated to fulfil each of the follow-up/evaluation functions that are planned for the future.**

*In case some of the institutions that are not presently involved in the project would be responsible for some of these functions, a plan should be prepared and implemented in order to involve them as soon as possible.*

*In case some of the present mandates should be modified (for technical, economic or practical reasons or for specific reasons in relation to the needs of the management of the Lake), there should be taken initiatives to make the necessary institutional (and statutory) changes.*

The primary justifications of this GEF project are the assumption of serious environmental problems and the realisation of the need for creating local capacities "around the Lake" in order to handle these problems. Therefore, the evaluation mission emphasises that the capacity building of the beneficiary countries plays an absolute priority part in the project.

Capacity building encompasses three elements: (1) establishment of the managerial framework for the Lake (concepts and principles, regional convention, strategic action plan, establishment of the Lake management entity); (2) mobilisation of the required human resources to ensure a new way of management and a long term monitoring of the Lake; (3) equipment for the management entity and the national structures with reference to the monitoring of the Lake and its basin.

For the moment, the capacity building is focused on the immediate needs of the project. Consequently, the training of national experts is focused on data acquisition, and the equipment of the national institutions has been defined based on these needs.

**Priority recommendation No. 8: Target the training towards the identified needs for the post-project phase**

*The evaluation mission feels that the training of national experts should not be limited to the immediate needs of the special studies. It should also and especially consider the needs for expertise in the post-project phase. To do so, it is important to define as soon as possible the outline of the future management entity of the Lake (mandates and job profiles) and to start training of a sufficient number of national experts to fill the planned jobs, taking into account an inevitable loss rate owing to predictable changes in career (for example by training two experts to the same type of job). At the present implementation level of the project the human resources of each country are sufficiently well-known to allow an immediate identification of the national experts to be trained.*

**Priority recommendation No. 9: Target the equipment of the national structures towards the needs of the monitoring post-project as well as against the intercalibration and the exchange of data**

*As for the previous recommendation, the evaluation mission feels that the equipment of the national structures should be designed not only according to the needs of the special studies but also according to the needs of monitoring of the post-project phase.*

*For that purpose, the equipment should avoid any double use and be homogenised to facilitate the intercalibration and the exchange of data between the riparian countries.*

### **3. Present state of substantive results and scheduling of future activities;**

At the beginning of its investigations the evaluation mission has noticed that the preparation of the elaborating process for the strategic action plan, before the completion of the special studies, did not allow the results from these to be taken into consideration and consequently deprived them of any utility. During the evaluation mission, at the TDA workshop in Lusaka (23-27 November 1998), the beneficiary countries asked for a modification of the scheduling of the project activities, which makes the special studies legitimate again.

#### **Priority recommendation No. 10: Respect the logic order of the production of results**

- |   |   |                                       |
|---|---|---------------------------------------|
| <i>1) Compilation of the existing data (incl. the national, regional and international legislative and institutional framework)</i> | <i>2) Elaboration of the regional agreement</i> | <i>4) Strategic action plan (SAP)</i> |
|   | <i>3) Special studies</i>                       |                                       |

The evaluation mission estimates that the results achieved till now, in varying degrees but in practically all fields (legal and institutional framework, planning strategies, substance of special studies, economic evaluation, participatory approaches), are not able to constitute a sufficiently solid basis for a sustainable management of the Lake and its basin.

#### **Priority recommendation No. 11: Make the synthesis of all the pertinent scientific knowledge acquired till now, which is necessary for the definition of the special studies and for the elaboration of management tools for the Lake**

*The evaluation mission considers that to date there is no summary presenting the basic data after control of their quality and in a way that allows the decision-makers of the riparian countries to exploit them. Consequently, the evaluation mission estimates that this work still needs to be done and that it should be prioritised before producing the other project results: special studies, convention, strategic action plans (see also priority recommendation No. 14).*

#### **Priority recommendation No. 12: Direct the production of project results towards the needs for a joint management of the Lake**

*Considering the hesitations in the approach and the delays that have been observed to date, the evaluation mission estimates that the project activities for the remaining project period should be*

*concentrated on the needs for the Lake management by the beneficiary countries. All academic types of activities should be concluded, no matter what may be their scientific interest, and it is important to avoid all activities that have no immediate utility, either in terms of intermediary results or in terms of final results exploitable for the joint management of the Lake.*

#### **4. Substantiality and scientific coherence of the special studies;**

The project concept is based on three general hypothesis concerning the environmental impacts that are threatening the Lake, namely: (a) the changes in land use has led to an increase in the discharge of sediments to the Lake which has an impact on the biodiversity; (b) the pollution damages the water quality and affects the biodiversity; (c) inappropriate and abusive fishing practices affect the biodiversity.

The evaluation mission estimates that these three assumptions were relevant as working hypothesis and that they justified the idea of the project considering the importance and the biologic richness of the Lake. However, none of the three hypothesis was proved by the time of the project formulation and still today none of them has been correctly documented.

**Priority recommendation No. 13: Treat as a major problem of the project the question of verifying (or invalidating) the basic hypothesis concerning the environmental impacts that are threatening the Lake**

*Identification of the real problems and of their seriousness is the only way of defining the future management functions. These functions require financial and human resources. However, the resources of the countries in question are very limited in these fields. It is therefore necessary to act with much discretion in order to avoid weighing unnecessarily on the resources intended for the economic and social development, devoting important means to the resolution of minor problems. The application of the "precaution principle" should be seen in this context.*

As indicated above, the evaluation mission finds that the project has produced only little documentation concerning the existing knowledge. The accomplished baseline studies, for example, are in fact limited to inventories of data sources and to the references of previous studies. Three years after the starting up of the project, the general hypotheses of the impact, which constitute the basis of the project, have still not been evaluated based on the compilation of existing data and the special studies are still not sufficiently advanced to give indisputable results.

**Priority recommendation No. 14: Complete the data bases regrouping the existing data and install them in the appropriate institutions**

*The data should be compiled and the state of present knowledge concerning the introductory hypotheses should be established (in order to serve as basis for subsequent studies). The improved understanding of the problems should become a continuous process allowing to refine the prioritisation of the management functions.*

Practically all the special studies have been started very late and certain parts of them have still not been initiated. The starting point of the technical studies has been the methodological workshop in August 1997. Most of the fieldwork has been started in 1998. Considering the lack of precision of the existing literature, the evaluation mission finds that the special studies play an important role in the verification (or the invalidation) of the basic hypotheses concerning the impact as well as in the development of strategies for the future monitoring. As expected from the origin of the project, the special studies constitute a precondition for the elaboration of the PAS (see priority recommendation No. 10).

**Priority recommendation No. 15: Maximum effort should be laid in a timely implementation of all the special studies and the overall planning of activities shall assure that they can provide the necessary background for the Strategic Action Plan.**

The evaluation mission has noticed a certain lack of precision in the overall view of each theme of the special studies and, in general, an insufficient knowledge of this overall view has been observed among the national operators.

As indicated above, this is due primarily to:

- the position of the special studies in the general scheduling of the project activities and to their lack of connection to other products of the project. This problem should be solved further to the changes requested during the TDA workshop in Lusaka (see priority recommendation No. 10);
- the lack of summary of the initial data supporting the special studies. This problem should find its solution if the priority recommendations No. 11 and 14 are implemented;
- the insufficient level of involvement of the national specialists in defining and interpreting the special studies. This problem should also find its solution if the priority recommendations No. 5 and 6 are implemented.

In addition to these reasons, the evaluation mission points out that the present documents which define the special studies, appear to be "standing instructions" to be complied with rather than arguments on the "why" and "how" of these studies.

**Priority recommendation No. 16: Prepare a document (as a supplement to the present "standing instructions" concerning the sampling and the laboratory work) on the overall technical approach and on the way the collected data may contribute to a better knowledge of the problems and to the development of the future management tools.**

*The activities should be prepared in collaboration with the national counterparts in order to guarantee that:*

1. *the approach followed by the project is clearly understood by the key persons of the levels in question:*

*Fieldwork      Data compilation      Assessment/Evaluation      Management*

2. *the local knowledge is not neglected but is used in an optimum way;*
3. *the scientific approach itself is transferred to the involved national institutions.*

One of the essential objectives of the project is to create a regional collaboration framework between the riparian countries of the Lake Tanganyika. It is desirable that the terms for such a collaboration are tried out as soon as possible during the project phase and taking advantage of the resources granted by UNDP/GEF.

However, the evaluation mission has noticed the unsatisfactory communication between the national teams working on the same study themes in the four countries. The following priority recommendation (no. 17) completes the priority recommendation No. 6 concerning the possible intervention of the national experts in other countries than their own, aiming at a better appropriation of the project methods and results by the nationals.

**Priority recommendation No. 17: Prepare and implement before the end of the project sustainable mechanisms/procedures for professional exchanges between the national experts in order to meet from now on the future needs for exchange of information, of experiences and of continuous harmonisation.**

As a supplement to these general aspects of the special studies, the evaluation mission has paid attention to each component of the special studies supposing that the scheduling of the results and consequently of the project activities was put back in a logical order.

For each theme of the special studies the evaluation mission has examined the following questions:

1. their justification (rationale);
2. the pursued goals, the methodology; etc.;
3. the present state of works;
4. the special points (methodological; scientific or technical) resulting in findings and/or recommendations.

These different questions are analysed in the body report for each component of the special studies (§ 3.3.3).

## **5. External factors bearing on the implementation of the project.**

As mentioned in the introduction there are some external factors which are seriously influencing the fulfilment of the project activities.

Firstly, the events in Burundi have had three effects:

- a) The impossibility of carrying out the activities normally during the first years of the project because of the insecure situation of the country. The country is still under the impact of a curfew

but the evaluation mission has noticed that the present situation allows the project activities (located next to the Lake) to be carried out normally since the summer 1998. Furthermore, the Scientific liaison officer of the project is presently based in Bujumbura. In this connection, the evaluation mission points out that if the security conditions in Bujumbura allows the Scientific liaison officer to carry out his activities in a normal way, this should also be possible for the Project Coordination Unit (PCU).

b) The transfer of the project head office to Dar es Salaam has had the effect of removing the Project Coordination Unit more than 1000 km away from the Lake which has not made the communication between the PCU and the field teams easier.

c) An embargo has struck the country since 1996 (it has been cancelled in January 1999 and the internal situation is improving).

**Priority recommendation No. 18: In accordance with the decision of the Project Steering Committee concerning the transfer of the project head office to Dar es Salaam, the evaluation mission recommends that the project head office is moved back to Bujumbura as soon as the two conditions, which make it possible, have been fulfilled: lifting of the curfew and of the embargo.**

Secondly, the civil war in Zaire (today the Democratic Republic of Congo), has been concentrated primarily to the Great Lakes region and has consequently prevented the normal carrying out of the project activities on the Congolese shore of the Lake. In spite of the pillage of their installations and of the risks they were running, the scientists of the CHR of Uvira have performed feats to bring certain activities to a successful conclusion. At the time of the evaluation mission, the situation is still insecure but there are hopes of a normalisation in the near future. The high level of involvement of the Congolese scientists makes believe that by that time the activities will be able to start at a rapid rate.

**Priority recommendation No. 19: The Project Coordination Unit should already now start preparing the scenarios concerning the restarting of the activities in D.R.Congo. Since the human resources are already in place, the PCU should pay a special attention to the procedures of a rapid transportation and installation of the necessary logistics in Uvira.**

Thirdly, the evaluation mission draws the attention of the project parties (the beneficiary countries, UNDP/GEF and UNOPS) to the particular problem of Rwanda. This country occupies a part of the Lake catchment and is, in that capacity, concerned by the project objectives. Originally, Rwanda was not associated since the view of the authors of the project was focused on the Lake biodiversity and not on the management of the Lake within its basin.

If the present concepts and principles for integrated water resources management are respected (see annex 7), then the need to associate Rwanda is obvious. As Rwanda is, however, not a riparian of the Lake, it cannot have the same degree of involvement in the management of its resources. But its position in the basin imposes the country a certain responsibility for the conservation of the Lake. So, either the present activities in the Rwandan part of the basin

(deforestation, erosion, pollution ?) have a confirmed impact, which would justify its immediate association, or these activities might require, one day or another, a cooperation with Rwanda and in this second case it would be advantageous to establish the basis for such a cooperation without delay by associating Rwanda with the project immediately (in a form which still needs to be defined and which takes into account the particular position of this country).

Since Rwanda sank into chaos in 1994, one year before the official start of the project, the question of its participation never occurred. Today, the internal situation of the country is being normalised and it is therefore legitimate to ask the question of Rwanda's role in the project.

**Priority recommendation No. 20: The evaluation mission recommends that the Rwandan government is invited to participate, as observer, in the next meeting of the Project Steering Committee and that the practical details in connection with its association with the project is put on the agenda for this meeting.**

**Priority recommendation No. 21: Considering the present state of progress of the project and the necessary time for these recommendations to give the expected effects and considering its experience with projects of this scope, the evaluation mission estimates that it is necessary to prolong the project period by approximately one and a half year, postponing the date of completion to December 31, 2001 in stead of July 31, 2000 as originally anticipated.**

**This prolongation should be made within the limits of the available budget.**

**For that purpose the Project Coordination Unit should submit to the Project Steering Committee a new working plan and a revised budget which comply with the new deadlines and follow the direction of the above mentioned recommendations.**

## **6. Lessons learned from the project**

The evaluation mission has tried hard to deduce the general observations which might be useful for other GEF projects.

In the first place, the evaluation mission has noticed – and all the consulted parties have agreed on this point – that the origin of certain problems is to be found in the insufficiency of the project document. The defects picked out by the evaluation mission are of different natures and are reviewed in the body report; it would therefore be tedious to resume them here. Let us just say, in order to simplify things, that the "good" intentions are not enough to make a "good" project document and that the "set-up" of such a project deserves a very careful examination of every line of the Prodoc. It is a pity that the deficiencies were not noticed during the instruction of the dossier before the project was adopted.

GEF should make sure that the project formulations respect the standards of the executive agents (in this case UNDP) and that a description of the activities is elaborated with a logic scheduling and in sufficient details to make an implementation possible.

**General recommendation: It is essential that the Prodoc format is respected, not only in its form but also in its logic. The executive agents of the GEF (in this case UNDP) should make sure that the document is realistic and operational.**

The evaluation mission has also noticed that certain problems can be attributed to the insufficient communication between the executive agency and the beneficiary countries. The proposal from the NRI Consortium is very different from the Prodoc which can easily be explained by the bad quality of the latter. Such differences should have alerted UNDP and UNOPS and should have given rise to a consultation of the beneficiary countries. As the proposal of the NRI Consortium is an integrated part of the contract, it should – as a minimum – have been communicated to the beneficiary countries in order to allow them to appropriate the new project formulation.

**General recommendation: The contract documents describing the substance of the project should be communicated to all the parties to the project, particularly to the beneficiary governments.**

Another important lesson to draw from this project is that UNOPS as well as UNDP/GEF and the Project Steering Committee as a whole, suffer from their lack of vigilance at the time where the project started to drift. The process of elaborating the SAP has been ratified even though this process (which was adopted to produce some results in spite of the delays of the special studies ?) was not the one that was envisaged by the Prodoc, it had no scientific foundation and was far to be logical.

**General recommendation: The follow-up of the implementation is essential for the success of a project. The contract documents (first of all the Prodoc) should stipulate a number of objectively verifiable indicators allowing to make sure that the project is progressing according to the schedule.**

Without implicating the procedures of the international call for tenders or the capacities of the consulting companies of the developed countries to run a project of this scope, the evaluation mission deplors that the choice of contractor did not take into account the executive arrangements with the beneficiary countries. The contractor was chosen on the basis of their interpretation of the Prodoc without defining the roles of the national institutions and without specifying the practical details for mobilising the national human resources, nor taking them into account in the process of going through the tenders.

Consequently, the project could not start immediately after the signature of the contract as the national teams had not yet been formed around the contractor. It took a long time (in some cases

more than two years) to identify and recruit the national experts that are working on the project today.

The evaluation mission is aware of the fact that the doctrine in this field has developed during the past years and that the same procedures are not applied today concerning the choice of contractor. Nonetheless, a special attention should be paid to the mobilisation of local resources when it comes to projects concerning institutional strengthening and capacity building.

**General recommendation: Projects concerning capacity building, like this one, should rely on a preliminary evaluation:**

- 1. of the mandates of the national institutions;**
- 2. of the local human resources**

**The evaluation should be included in the Prodoc and serve as basis for the mobilisation of national operators.**

**In case of international call for tenders, the choice of contractor must take into account its capacities to mobilise around his own expertise the national institutions and experts who are capable of taking in hand the results of the project at its completion.**

Finally, in order to avoid any rupture at the end of the project, the evaluation mission finds that it would be judicious to plan a follow-up phase (for a period at least corresponding to the project period but handled by the national counterparts) during which the results of the project could be tested. If such a follow-up procedure is accepted beforehand by the beneficiary countries, it would be a guarantee for their engagement to implement the project results.

**General recommendation: Projects concerning institutional strengthening, like this one, should include a period for follow-up of the results, handled by the beneficiary countries and intended to test the structures and the procedures inherited from the project. During this period, the executive agent from the GEF (in this case UNDP) should continue to make a reduced monitoring in close collaboration with the involved governments.**